A recent study of how a monkey's frontal cortex responds when decisions are made more difficult has characterised the two distinct stages which turn sensory evidence into a command for action.
The recent flurry of studies on aspects of the neural decision-making process has been exhilarating, but how do the various observations fit together? A powerful argument is beginning to emerge that seems to make sense of this medley of experimental and theoretical data: decisions are not unitary events, but arise from two distinct sequential processes.
Imagine looking through long grass at a moving animal. If it is a tiger we might respond by running; but perhaps it is just a cat? We need to decide quickly whether the tiger hypothesis is correct. The first step is to register the fragments of information available -a glimpse of orange, a heavy footstep, a flashing tooth… The next step is to assemble these fragments of evidence -some for, some against -to evaluate the truth of the hypothesis. This second stage also includes our prior expectation -is a cat not more likely than a tiger? -and the implications of being wrongclearly running from a cat is far less catastrophic than stroking a tiger.
Or consider the most common decision we make -we do it two or three times a second throughout our waking liveswhat to look at next. The first stage in deciding to make this movement -a saccade -is to establish the existence and location of components of the visual scene. Next, we need to decide to which part of the visual scene it is most important to shift our gaze. This is an ideal decision to study, being simple, unselfconscious and easy to manipulate. Indeed, studying saccades has taught us much about these two stages of decision making and their representation in the brain.
Stage 1: registration
Neurons in the frontal eye fields (FEFs) respond to the appearance of those stimuli that are potential targets for saccades; their maintained activity level shows selectivity for colour and shape, but only responds to fragments of the visual scene available to their receptive field [1] . In a distractor task, where for instance the subject must shift gaze to a green target amongst red distractors, the initial response is the same whether the stimulus is red or green. Over time however, as sensory evidence accumulates, the response to red stimuli falls and the late phase of activity reliably distinguishes red from green ( Figure 1 ). The time taken for the activities to diverge significantly (T d ) is increased when target and distractor are similar [2] -indeed we can imagine that it takes longer to distinguish a fragment of tiger from cat if the cat is ginger.
Several strands of evidence suggest that this stage of stimulus registration is distinct from a subsequent stage that interprets the evidence and determines a response. First, T d , the relatively consistent time for a visual neuron in the FEF to make its discrimination, does not reliably predict the overall response time, which is characteristically far more variable [3] . Furthermore, FEF neurons show target discrimination activity even when no subsequent response is made [4] . The upper traces compare the activity derived from a visually responsive FEF neuron when a target (black line) or a distractor (red line) appears in the receptive field. Although initially the response is the same to both, after a certain period the response to the distractor falls whilst the response to the target is maintained. (Adapted from [3] .) The lower trace demonstrates the constant rate of rise of activity from a movement selective cell (blue line) following divergence of the response to target and distractor in the visually selective cell. Here, the activity is derived from the firing of the neuron from a selection of trials of median latency. In practice, the rate of rise varies randomly between trials; the saccade is only initiated after the activity reaches a constant threshold level. (Adapted from [10] . A recent study in Jeff Schall's lab has addressed this question particularly directly. Sato et al. [5] suggest that T d marks the conclusion of perceptual processing: thus, whilst making discrimination more difficult will increase T d , making the subsequent response more difficult will not. Figure 2 shows this is indeed what happens: and the increase in reaction time produced by making the targets harder to discriminate can be entirely attributed to an increase in T d . Therefore, by the end of stage one we have an array of units responding selectively to various features of the scene -colour, shape, motion -but we have yet to integrate this information in order to identify the stimulus and justify a response. Like court witnesses, these units have given their version of events as they see them but will have no role in interpreting the crime or passing sentence. Is the second stage the judge, who brings together the evidence, identifies the guilty party and administers justice?
Stage 2: interpretation
Much of our knowledge of this second stage of the decision process comes from behavioural, rather than electrophysiological, experiments. When we measure saccadic reaction times there are two striking features: they are both unexpectedly long and surprisingly variable. Further analysis of this variability led Roger Carpenter [6] to develop a simple model, referred to as LATER for 'linear approach to threshold with ergodic rate', which economically describes the second stage in our decision process both for saccades and other movements.
The LATER model postulates the existence of competing decision signals that represent alternative hypotheses about the nature and location of a stimulus. Fuelled by incoming sensory evidence, the decision signal rises at a constant rate. The signals race to reach a threshold level of confidence, at which the winning hypothesis is accepted and the appropriate response generated. In order to add the biological advantage of unpredictability to the response, the rate of signal rise varies randomly about a mean value that reflects the rate of arrival of information about the stimulus. For example, if there are more gaps in the grass, letting through more visual information, we will build up evidence for or against the tiger hypothesis more rapidly. In terms of neural processes, this would translate into a larger number of first-stage witness neurons feeding into a second-stage judgement neuron whose activity thus changes more quickly.
Clearly, factors other than information affect the reaction time. Prior probability is one of them: judges take into account previous convictions when making their decision. In the LATER model, the prior probability corresponds to the starting level from which the decision signal rises, so that a hypothesis about an expected stimulus is accepted more quickly: if we are roaming Bengal, then we will accept the tiger hypothesis more quickly than if we are in Paris. Another factor is the confidence we require in our hypothesis: we accept a hypothesis more rapidly if the implications of being wrong are less catastrophic than the (a) Activity in visually responsive neurons of the FEF following appearance of an eight stimulus array. Both colour search and motion search were investigated. In colour search, the discrimination was made harder by making the colours more similar. In motion search, each stimulus was a circular aperture of randomly positioned dots which translated coherently in a specified direction (target opposite direction from distractors); targets were made harder to discriminate by reducing the number of coherently moving dots. The time taken for the target (black line) and distractor (red line) responses to deviate significantly (T d ) is greater when the stimuli are harder to discriminate (bottom). (b) The change in T d accounts for the increase in reaction time under this condition, suggesting that T d reflects the completion of visual discrimination. (c) Activity in visually responsive FEF neurons following the presentation of eight coloured stimuli. A display supporting the most simple colour search was used, and under the easy condition the monkey made a saccade to the green target, ignoring the red distractors. Under the difficult condition, the target and a distractor unexpectedly swapped positions during some of the trials and the monkey had to abandon the first saccade and plan another one to the new target position in order to earn a reward. Although these 'step' trials were not included in the analysis, the overall response time for saccades under this condition were increased as the monkeys planned their responses more cautiously. implications of being too slow, the urgency versus accuracy profile of a decision is represented in LATER by the threshold confidence level. Recent experiments designed to challenge the model have shown that manipulating parameters of the decision process -the information in a random dot display (unpublished data obtained in Carpenter's lab), the prior probability that a target stimulus will appear at one location [7] , or the balance of urgency versus accuracy [8] -generates the specific changes in reaction time distribution that are predicted by the LATER model.
We can also record from movement-selective neurons in the FEF, which appear to embody the second stage of the decision-making process and show similar behaviour to the LATER decision signal. These cells, activated after the visually responsive cells of stage one, reliably predict the generation of a response; indeed the time course of their activity predicts the overall reaction time (Figure 1 ). This activity rises at a constant rate, subject to random variation, and a response is initiated when a certain threshold level is reached that is constant between trials [9] .
An important contrast between the first and second stages is in the way they deal with negative evidence. Although visually responsive cells of the first stage accumulate local information, second-stage neurons must compare evidence for and against their hypothesis gathered from across the visual field. For example, if nearly all positive evidence about a stimulus points to a ginger cat, but one negative fact -a dinner-plate-sized paw -points against, we would be somewhat foolish to consider the positive evidence alone whilst ignoring the negative. The all-pervasive mechanism of lateral inhibition may provide a means for voting for and against [10, 11] .
Overall, the marriage of behavioural and electrophysiological investigation seems to characterise a second-stage process that might integrate and contrast information from stage one to reach a likely interpretation of the stimulus and elicit the appropriate response.
Linking the stages
The question remains as to how the first stage drives activity in the second. The maintained activity in stage one, and the rising activity in stage two, suggest that stage two might simply integrate the signal from stage one. More specifically, as the responses in stage one neurons to targets and distractors begin to diverge, the maintained signals are contrasted by the second stage -evidence against the hypothesis being subtracted from the evidence for. This difference is then integrated, the accumulation of activity in the second stage thus determining the strength of the evidence for one hypothesis over another ( Figure 3 ). This explains why the rise in stage two does not begin until the start of the divergence in stage one (Figure 1 ).
If stage two does indeed integrate the differences in this way, then we would expect that reducing the rate of accumulation of activity in stage one would lead to a delay in the take off of the signal in stage two. Preliminary results
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Figure 3
Highly schematic representation of the two steps from stimulus to saccadic decision. The visual scene consists of an array of randomly moving dots and the subject is instructed to make a saccade in the net direction of movement. 
Random dot display
Stage two neurons
Current Biology
Stage one neurons
Saccade from the labs of both Schall and Carpenter suggest that this is the case (J.D. Schall and R.H.S. Carpenter, personal communications).
Clearly, behavioural and electrophysiological investigations complement each other, bringing us some way to understanding at least simple decision making. However, there is a subtle theoretical issue in delineating the role of the second stage of the process -is it interpreting the stimulus or selecting the response? Carpenter holds that stage two is the point of interpretation, where flashes of orange become a tiger or the judge identifies the crime. Schall suggests that stage two is response selection, running from the tiger or passing a sentence. Carpenter assumes that interpreting is deciding to act, that conviction of a crime leads automatically to a sentence, whilst Schall's view suggests that perhaps incontrovertible evidence of guilt is sufficient for sentencing without formal conviction.
In the case of saccades, the response is ready to go as soon as the brainstem oculomotor centres are released from their inhibition; as essentially no planning is involved, Carpenter's assumption might well hold. But complex tasks do require planning and take longer: might we therefore envisage a third stage? Perhaps interpretation is followed by selection of one of several alternative responses that are being planned concurrently elsewhere. The approach of Sato et al. [5] to investigating a decision allows the direct measurement of the duration of component processes and factors influencing them. Such techniques may enable us to forge ahead with the study of decisions of greater complexity.
